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ABSTRACT
The “colored-brain thesis”, or strong qualitative physicalism, is discussed from historical and 
philosophical perspectives. This thesis was proposed by Thomas Case (1888), in a non-materi-
alistic context, and is close to views explored by H. H. Price (1932) and E. Boring (1933). Using 
Mary’s room thought experiment, one can argue that physicalism implies qualitative physical-
ism. Qualitative physicalism involves three basic statements: (i) perceptual internalism, and 
realism of qualia; (ii) ontic physicalism, charaterized as a description in space, time, and scale; 
and (iii) mind-brain identity thesis. In addition, (iv) structuralism in physics, and distinguishing 
the present version from that suggested by H. Feigl and S. Pepper, (v) realism of the physical 
description. The “neurosurgeon argument” is presented, as to why the greenness of a visually 
perceived avocado, which (according to this view) is present in the brain as a physical-chemi-
cal attribute, would not be seen as green by a neurosurgeon who opens the observer’s skull. 
This conception is compared with two close views, Russellian (and Schlickian) monisms and 
panprotopsychism (including panqualityism). According to the strong qualitative physicalism 
presented here, the phenomenal experience of a quale q is identical to a physico-chemical 
quality q, which arises from a combination of (1) the materiality ω associated with the brain, 
and (2) the causal organization or structure of the relevant elements of the brain ∑, including 
in this organization the structure of the self: (∑ω)
q
. The “explanatory gap” between mental 
and physical states is shifted to a gap between the physico-chemical qualities q and the orga-
nized materiality of a specific brain region (∑ω)
q
, and is seen as being bridged only by a set of 
non-explanatory postulates. 
Keywords: Colored-brain thesis, qualitative physicalism, mind-brain identity thesis, qualia, 
panprotopsychism, sensorium.
RESUMO
Discute-se em um viés histórico e defende-se a “tese do encéfalo colorido”, ou fisicismo 
qualitativo forte. Esta tese foi proposta por Thomas Case (1888), em um contexto não ma-
terialista, e é próxima a visões exploradas por H. H. Price (1932) e E. Boring (1933). Usan-
do o experimento mental do quarto de Mary, pode-se argumentar que fisicismo implica 
fisicismo qualitativo. O fisicismo qualitativo envolve três afirmações básicas: (i) internismo 
perceptivo e realidade dos qualia; (ii) fisicismo ôntico, caraterizado como uma descrição 
no espaço, no tempo e na escala; e (iii) identidade mente-encéfalo. Além disso, adicio-
na-se (iv) o estruturalismo na física e, distinguindo a presente versão daquelas sugeridas 
por H. Feigl e S. Pepper, (v) o realismo da descrição física. Apresenta-se o “argumento do 
neurocirurgião”, de porque a verdidão de um abacate percebido visualmente, que estaria 
presente no encéfalo como um atributo fisicoquímico, não seria visto como verde por um 
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1. History of the view
The colored-brain thesis is the name given by Leopold 
Stubenberg (1998, p. 169) to the view that subjective phe-
nomenal qualities, or qualia, are “properties of the brain”. Hen-
ry H. Price (1932) referred to this thesis as the “hypothesis 
that sense-data are cerebral”:
To say that when a man looks at a tomato 
he is acquainted with a reddened portion 
of his own brain, or with a sounding tract 
of it when he hears a noise, is very singular. 
And others besides Bradley find it hard to 
believe that ‘when I smell a smell I am aware 
of the stinking state of my own nervous sys-
tem’ (Price, 1932, p. 127). 
Price points out, in the above quotation, that the Hege-
lian philosopher Francis Herbert Bradley criticizes the theory 
proposed by the Oxford philosopher Thomas Case (1888), 
who charact erized sense perception as the “the immediate ap-
prehension of an internal physical object inside the nervous 
system of a sentient being” (Case, 1888, p. 33). 
Case was led to this view by an application of the ancient 
principle of attract ion of like to like (cf. Empedocles’ stanza in 
Aristotle, De Anima, Bk. I, Ch. 2, 404b 8): “The similar can be 
inferred only from the similar, therefore the physical can be 
inferred only from the physical” (Case, 1888, p. 23):
If, then, natural science requires that the 
object of sense must be within my nervous 
system in order to be sensible, and log-
ic that it must be physical in order to infer 
physical objects of science in the external 
world, how can the sensible object be at 
once physical and internal? I answer, it is 
the nervous system itself sensibly affected. 
The hot felt is the tactile nerves heated, the 
white seen is the optic nerves so coloured. 
(Case, 1888, p. 24).
Case considers his “physical realism” to be a middle way 
between the direct or “intuitive” realism of the Scottish school 
(Thomas Reid, Dugald Stewart and William Hamilton) and 
the “hypothetical” realism of “cosmothetic idealism” (René Des-
cartes, John Locke and Samuel Clarke), which postulates an un-
knowable reality beyond the senses (in opposition to the absolute 
idealism of George Berkeley and Arthur Collier, which denies 
this reality) (compare this analysis with Hatfield’s, 2015, p. 111):
Such is the realism proposed in this essay. 
It may be expressed in two propositions: 
there are physical objects of science in the 
external world; therefore there are, as data 
to infer them, physical objects of sense in 
the internal nervous system. It is the via me-
dia between intuitive realism and hypothet-
ical realism of the cosmothetic idealist. As 
it recognizes physical realities, it is realism. 
As the objects, which it supposes to be sen-
sible, are not external but internal, it is not 
intuitive realism. As the objects of sense, 
which it supposes to be the data of inferring 
an external physical world, are not psychical 
but physical, it is not hypothetical realism. 
As they are physical data within, to infer 
physical objects without, the realism which 
I advocate may be called Physical Realism 
(Case, 1888, p. 26).
Case’s position, however, is not materialist or physical-
ist, first because he considers that God created and rules the 
world (Case, 1888, p. 20). Moreover, the internal object of 
sensation, which he postulates as being physical, is taken to 
be distinct from the “internal operation” that grasps it, which 
would be of the order of the “psychical”: “There is some plau-
sibility in saying that the act of consciously touching is psychi-
cal, there is none at all in saying that the heat felt is psychical” 
(Case, 1888, p. 24). 
It seems that the colored-brain thesis was not explicitly 
advocated by anyone else, although Price (1932) wrote that 
“philosophers have been accustomed to discuss the question 
whether sense-data are physical or mental” (Price, 1932, p. 
127). In fact, in the interwar period, when sense-data theo-
ries and materialism coexisted in English sp eaking philosophy, 
the American psychologist and historian of psychology Edwin 
Boring came close to the colored-brain thesis, in his book The 
physical dimensions of consciousness (1933). It was this work that 
influenced U.T. Place (1956) to develop his version of the mind-
brain identity thesis (Place, 2000).  The mind-brain identity 
thesis has a history that is intertwined with materialism, and 
neurocirurgião que abra o crânio do observador. Compara-se esta corrente com duas visões próximas, os monismos 
russellianos (e schlickianos) e o pamprotopsiquismo (incluindo o panqualitatismo). Segundo o fisicismo qualitativo forte 
aqui apresentado, a vivência fenomênica de um quale q é idêntica a uma qualidade fisicoquímica q, que surge de uma 
combinação da (1) materialidade ω associada ao encéfalo e (2) da organização ou estrutura causal ∑ dos elementos rele-
vantes do encéfalo, incluindo nesta organização a estrutura do self: (∑ω)
q
. A “lacuna explicativa” entre estados mentais 
e físicos migra para uma lacuna entre qualidades físico-químicas q e a materialidade organizada de uma região específica 
do encéfalo (∑ω)
q
, e é vista como podendo ser coberta apenas por postulados não explicativos.
Palavras-chave: Tese do encéfalo colorido, fisicismo qualitativo, identidade mente-encéfalo, qualia, pamprotopsiquis-
mo, sensório.
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was put forward by Boring in the following statement, quoted 
by Place: “To the author a perfect correlation is identity. Two 
events that always occur together at the same time in the same 
place, without any temporal or spatial differentiation at all, are 
not two events but the same event” (Boring, 1933, p. 16). Place 
next ponders on why Boring was ignored by philosophers:
Boring moreover, was himself apparently 
committed to combining the identity theo-
ry with a phenomenalist account of sensory 
qualities which on Leibniz’s principle of the 
Identity of Indiscernibles would commit him 
to the view that certain brain events are lit-
erally green, high pitched, warm, sour or 
putrid, which for a philosopher would con-
stitute an immediate knockdown reductio ad 
absurdum of his position (Place, 2000, p. 1).
We see therefore that Boring got close to the col-
ored-brain thesis, in spite of not having mentioned it explicitly. 
Place had criticized this thesis in his seminal paper of 1956, in 
which he supported a reductionist materialism. In this work, 
there is not properly sp eaking a mind-brain identity thesis, 
but the thesis that the mind is “composed” of brain parts, and 
nothing else, which is a form of reductionism which comes 
close to eliminativism. The colored-brain thesis is mentioned 
and criticized in the following excerpt:
This logical mistake, which I shall refer to as 
the ‘phenomenological fallacy’, is the mis-
take of supposing that when the subject 
describes his experience, when he describes 
how things look, sound, smell, taste or feel 
to him, he is describing the literal properties 
of objects and events on a peculiar sort of in-
ternal cinema or television screen, usually re-
ferred to in the modern psychological litera-
ture as the ‘phenomenal field’. If we assume, 
for example, that when a subject reports a 
green after-image he is asserting the occur-
rence inside himself of an object which is lit-
erally green, it is clear that we have on our 
hands an entity for which there is no place 
in the world of physics. In the case of the 
green after-image there is no green object 
in the subject’s environment corresponding 
to the description that he gives. Nor is there 
anything green in his brain; certainly there 
is nothing which could have emerged when 
he reported the appearance of the green af-
ter-image. Brain processes are not the sort of 
things to which colour concepts can be prop-
erly applied (Place, 1956, p. 49).
2. The neurosurgeon argument 
The usual react ion to the colored-brain thesis is to con-
sider it absurd, as did Bradley, in the sense that it is an obvious 
mistake to suppose that “to see red, there must be red neurons 
in the brain” (O’Regan and  Noë, 2001, pp. 947, 1010, 1018). 
However, the answer of strong qualitative physicalism to 
this objection is simple, involving a subtle Gest alt shift. The 
view associated with the colored-brain thesis is “internalist” 
in relation to colors and other qualia: the subjective greenness 
we experience as we look at an avocado is not in the fruit, 
but in our brain. The avocado is the cause of the greenness 
produced in us, and this cause is associated to the electronic 
properties of the pigment molecules in the skin of the avoca-
do, that modulate the reflection of incident light. 
Take a neurosurgeon, to be named Wilder, who has 
opened the skull and brain of patient Ullin and observes it in 
the appropriate part of the “sensorium” (the place where qual-
ia allegedly exist). Suppose that Ullin contemplates an avoca-
do and is having the subjective experience of greenness: it is 
clear that Wilder (looking only at his patient’s brain) would 
not also have the subjective experience of greenness. In the 
words of Price, who imagined “if a living brain were cut up by 
a physiologist”, “those colour-expanses would not be the ones 
which the owner of the brain was aware of, but would differ 
from them completely in shape, colour and position” (Price, 
1932, p. 128).
The reason for this difference is simple: Ullin’s brain in 
the state of greenness does not have the electronic properties 
(mentioned above) that might, after being illuminated, selec-
tively absorb light and cause in Wilder the appearance of the 
quale of greenness. Subjective color has nothing to do with light
(except for the meticulous causal connection between the 
two): our brains are dark (Dennett, 1992, p. 28).  
The Gest alt shift involved is the change from common 
sense externalism (“greenness is in the avocado”) to the inter-
nalism of views such as sense-data theory or the thesis of the 
reality of qualia (“greenness is in the mind”). Adding to this 
the mind-brain identity thesis, one arrives at: “greenness is in 
the brain”. The idea that the colored-brain thesis would imply 
that Wilder would see green neurons inside Ullin’s brain (or 
that the mad scientist who licks the patient’s brain, while the 
latter is eating chocolate, would taste the chocolate - Nagel, 
1987, p. 29) stems from an implicit adoption of the externalist 
view (Stubenberg, 1998, p. 173-74 misses this point, together 
with Dennett and Nagel).
The colored-brain thesis leads to the idea that the expe-
rienced greenness is a real physico-chemical attribute not yet 
recognized by contemporary physics, a real quality of matter. 
The term “attribute” is used in a generic sense, as it is not clear 
whether it would be a property, a relation, a process or anoth-
er metaphysical category.
3. Other criticisms
The colored-brain thesis is naturally rejected by any du-
alistic view, such as that of John Stuart Mill (1843, bk. I, ch. 
III, § 4): “These are states of my body; but the sensation of 
blue, which is the consequence of these states of body, is not 
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a state of the body: that which perceives and is conscious is 
called Mind” (Mill, 1843, p. 68). 
According to some of its critics, the colored-brain thesis 
is subject to the so-called “sense-data fallacy” of Harold Prich-
ard and John Austin: “(…) the inference from the fact that 
one perceives a tomato that appears red to the fact that one 
perceives a red appearance” (Den Otter, 2005, p. 160). Con-
sidering that perception involves a causal chain that starts 
from things in the external world, passes through the sense 
organs, and enters the brain, one may consider (as is done in 
the causal-pluralist theory of observation, in Pessoa, 2019b) 
that one is observing either the external tomato, or a pattern 
on the retina, or the most proximal cause to perception in the 
sensorium (which would be the material part identical to the 
subjective perception of the tomato – what could be called 
the “red appearance”). Thus, there would be no fallacy. An-
other version of this same point (with which we also disagree) 
is the “phenomenological fallacy”, mentioned above in the 
quote by Place (1956), which denies the reality of the green 
appearance experienced in an after-image (due to looking, for 
example, at a white wall after looking at a red tomato).
We have already quoted excerpts from Price (1932), 
who discusses the thesis that “sense-data are cerebral” over 
five pages (pp. 127-131). The Welsh philosopher comes to 
interpret the thesis with sympathy, provided that the brain 
is not considered just a material or physico-chemical system, 
but also “an organ of a living thing”, so that the sense-data “are 
neither physical nor mental but vital, in the sense in which 
breathing and digesting are vital” (Price, 1932, p. 127).
The approximation between “psychosubstantialism” (or 
“quidism”, the thesis that the mind involves qualities or inscru-
tables, which should be distinguished from mechanical work-
ing of the parts of the brain, as will be reviewed in section 6)) 
and vitalism (in a broad sense, the thesis that life is something 
beyond the mechanical working of the living parts) leads to a 
view that there are “vital qualities” that would distinguish for 
example a flatworm from a robot that simulates it cell by cell. 
Vitalist conceptions were common at the turn of the 19th to 
the 20th centuries, but they usually postulated causal pow-
ers above the causes described by physiology. The position 
suggest ed here does not conceive of additional causal pow-
ers, but only the concomitant existence of “qualities”, which 
would constitute an epiphenomenalist view if it were not for 
the identity thesis.
Another suggestion that Price makes is to interpret the 
problem following the theory of emergence of Lloyd Morgan 
and C.D. Broad (among others), thus stating the colored-brain 
thesis in the following way: 
In so far as cerebral processes have this sen-
suous aspect, the brain, one would say, is 
also the sensorium; if so, the thesis is that it 
is the sensorium which is sonorous when we 
hear a bell, and red when we see a tomato. 
Or one might use the language of the Emer-
gent Theory, and hold that sensual qualities 
such as red and loud emergently qualify cer-
tain physico-chemical processes in the brain 
when these reach a certain degree of com-
plexity (Price, 1932, p. 128). 
Price then discusses some difficulties that he sees in this 
view, concerning esp ecially the localization of sense-data in 
space. We will return to this discussion in section 8.
4. What is “physical”?
The question of whether qualia are physical or not as-
sumes that we have a definition of “physical”. Any physicalist 
position must define what it means by “physical”, but there is 
no consensual definition of the term.
A common definition in the philosophy of mind is as-
sociated with Mary’s room thought-experiment ( Jackson, 
1982). Inside her black and white room, Mary would have 
access to “all physical knowledge” about colors, but she would 
never have experienced colors (other than those in the scale 
of gray). When Mary finally sees a color for the first time, 
one concludes that she acquires some “non-physical knowl-
edge” about the world (if not before, at least after learning 
how to name the color), i.e., acquaintance with qualia involves 
“non-physical knowledge”.
In this thought experiment, physical knowledge is de-
fined as theoretical statements and models, involving lan-
guage and mathematics, which lead to the experimental ca-
pacity for manipulating nature. The “physical” would then be 
what is described by the linguistic and mathematical struc-
tures, which amounts to the causal structure of the world, and 
which is amenable to experimental manipulation.
And qualia, would they be “physical” entites or not? 
Jackson’s argument is limited to concluding that qualia are 
not known by “physical knowledge”. To conclude that qual-
ia are non-physical entities, it would be necessary to add one 
more hypothesis to the argument, that “if something is know-
able and if it is physical, then it is physically knowable” (this 
proposition is denoted by “L4” in Pessoa, 2019a, p. 189). With 
this hypothesis, one infers that there is something non-phys-
ical that is knowable, which in the thought-experiment are 
qualia. Therefore, physicalism would be false, since not every-
thing would be physical.
On the other hand, the rejection of the aforementioned 
proposition L4 that is, the acceptance of the thesis that there 
is something physical that is knowable without being “physi-
cally knowable” (in Jackson’s sense), is consistent with the the-
sis that qualia are physical, as held by qualitative physicalism.
In short, the acceptance of Jackson’s argument forces 
the physicalist to accept the colored-brain thesis. In other 
words, accepting the definition of “physical knowledge” from 
the Mary’s room argument, it follows that physicalism implies 
qualitative physicalism.
But the physicalist may find Jackson’s definition too re-
strictive, and consider that acquaintance with qualia consti-
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tutes direct physical knowledge, as opposed to the indirect 
physical knowledge typical of the theoretical, linguistic-quan-
titative knowledge which Mary has within her room with 
resp ect to colors. The thesis that all theoretical knowledge in 
physics refers to causal structures in the world (and to other 
structures, such as symmetry relations) is known as “structur-
alism in physics”. The thesis that physical knowledge is limited 
to the description of these structures may be called “mech-
anicism”, in a broad sense. The qualitative physicalism main-
tained here shares with Mach, Schlick, and Russell the thesis 
that these structures are relations known in an indirect and 
inferential way, through the immediate knowledge of sensa-
tions or qualia.
Although we do not explicitly define what is “physical”, 
we will charact erize a physical process with three properties: 
(a) localization in space and time; (b) occurrence in a scale 
(micro, macro, etc.); and (c) absence of final causes, i.e., at the 
elementary level there is no purpose or intentionality (for a 
naturalistic approach to intentionality, see Millikan, 2000). A 
consequence of this charact erization of “physical”, for strong 
realist qualitative physicalism, is that every mental process (a 
visual quale, a theoretical idea) must be associated with a spa-
tial localization (in addition to temporal and scalar localiza-
tions), even if such localization is distributed over a network 
in the central nervous system (more on this in section 8).
5. Assumptions of the view
In defending the colored-brain thesis, the following as-
sumptions were implicitly assumed:
(i) Perceptive internalism and reality of qualia. Internalism 
in the philosophy of perception is the doctrine of the primary 
and secondary properties of Galileo, Descartes, Locke, etc., 
according to which the phenomenal qualities (qualia) exist 
only in the mind, not in the external world. When looking at 
a green avocado, or smelling the scent of sandalwood, we can 
focus our attention on the greenness or the sandalwoodness. 
The reality of qualia thesis states that such phenomenal quali-
ties do in fact exist, as does a green afterimage that arises after 
staring at a tomato, and a female voice that one hallucinates 
after a night of exhausting work. At the beginning of the 20th 
century, qualia were described as “sense-data”, and conceived 
as something exclusively mental, separate from the thing that 
causes the sensation (e.g. the avocado in the fruit bowl, the 
perfume in the bottle) and from the material processes occur-
ring in the brain.
(ii) Ontic physicalism. According to this thesis, everything 
is material, i.e., everything that exists can be conceived from 
within the worldview of physics and chemistry. Furthermore, 
living beings are considered as having evolved and emerged 
from a physico-chemical universe lacking intentionality, 
within the framework of space-time. Contemporary physics 
may be insufficient for the understanding of consciousness, 
but consciousness must have a material basis located spa-
tio-temporally. As indicated in the previous section, a quale 
or an idea must have spatial localization, size, temporal coor-
dinate and duration. 
(iii) Mind-brain identity thesis. The most direct way of 
connecting theses (i) and (ii) is through the thesis that qual-
ia are identical to brain processes. With Place (1956), the 
identity thesis started being associated with the version that 
privileges the material ontological status of brain processes, 
a status conceived in linguistic-quantitative terms. But Bor-
ing’s (1933, p. 16) approach, mentioned in section 1, placed 
qualititative states on equal terms as brain states. Qualitative 
physicalism’s use of the identity thesis should amount to con-
sidering qualitative mental states as identical to qualitative 
physico-chemical states (see more in section 9). One may 
also consider Spinoza’s attribute dualism as a version of the 
identity thesis, a form of monism that also appears in Gus-
tav Fechner (1966, p. 3) and in Thomas Nagel (1987, chap. 
4), views which privilege neither matter or mind, but a more 
fundamental substance. 
In section 8 we will complete this list of assumptions of 
qualitative physicalism.
6. Russellian type monisms
In his book Analysis of matter (1927), Bertrand Russell 
arrived at a position close to qualitative physicalism, a mo-
nism constituted of sensorial elements or “percepts”. Such a 
domain would be “neutral” in relation to matter and mind, 
as Ernst Mach had formulated, in a view that had a good re-
ception in the United States, being adopted by William James 
(Banks, 2014, p. 1-3). Traditional neutral monism’s claim is 
that both the external world and the self are collections or 
bundles of sensations.2 Identity applies to the sensorial ele-
ment, not to the distinct configurations of elements that re-
ceive the names of mind and body. Thus, one concludes that 
the physical world consists of the same elements that we con-
sciously experience. 
Russell emphasized that physics only captures the rela-
tions between things, and not the things in themselves (not 
the relata of the relations), and this in an indirect, inferen-
tial way. As mentioned in section 4, such a position is known 
as “structuralism in physics”, or “structural realism”. Russell 
stressed that science is built upon inferences, and the only in-
trinsic reality to which we have access (besides the relations 
between sensations, which reveal the extrinsic relations be-
tween things) are the sensations themselves: “Percepts are the 
2 More recently, the term “neutral monism” has come to refer to any monism that is neutral in relation to the poles of mind and matter, 
such the attribute dualism of Spinoza mentioned in section 5. Here we are referring to the “traditional” neutral monism of Mach, Av-
enarius, Petzoldt, James, Perry, Holt, Schlick, and Russell (Stubenberg, 2016).
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only part of the physical world that we know otherwise than 
abstractly” (Russell, 1927, p. 402). 
Russell’s position has influenced several recent authors, 
culminating in the collection edited by Alter and Nagasawa 
(2015). Authors like Grover Maxwell, Michael Lockwood, 
and David Chalmers developed views inspired by the English 
philosopher, generating a class of conceptions they called 
“Russellian monisms”. What they put forth that is important 
is the notion that there are “qualities”, “quiddities” or “inscru-
tables” (the things in themselves) that constitute the entire 
physical world, and to which we do not have direct access, 
except the sensations that we experience subjectively (qualia). 
Alter and Nagasawa (2012, pp. 432-6) present four concep-
tions about the nature of these inscrutables: (a) phenomenal 
properties, as suggest ed by Russell; (b) non-physical “pro-
tophenomenal” properties, as suggest ed by Chalmers (1996, 
pp. 126-7); (c) neither physical nor mental properties, as in 
asp ect dualism (Nagel, 1987, chap. 4); (d) physical properties 
of a sp ecial sort.
Qualitative physicalism falls into this last category, tak-
ing subjective sensation as identical to a real physico-chemi-
cal quality. Given that a quale is an inscrutable, by extension 
(that is, by inductive inference or analogy) one may assume 
that matter in general has similar qualities or quiddities, and 
that these combine in some way in the brain tissue to generate 
the complex of qualities that we experience daily. This possi-
bility is considered by Herbert Feigl (1971), commenting on 
the “pan-quality-ism” proposed by the philosopher Stephen 
Pepper (see section 8), conceding that it “is not unreasonable 
provided that the ‘intrinsic qualities’ of inorganic things or 
systems are conceived as incomparably more ‘colorless’ than 
the qualities of human experience” (Feigl, 1971, p. 308). Feigl 
also stresses that a view similar to Russell’s had been proposed 
by Moritz Schlick in 1918:
The world is a variegated structure of con-
nected qualities. Some of them are given 
to my (or to some other person’s) con-
sciousness and these qualities I call subjec-
tive or mental; others are not given directly 
to any consciousness and these I designate 
as objective or extra-mental (Schlick, 1974, 
p. 292).
Feigl (1979, p. 325) points out that the monisms of 
Schlick and Russell are not, strictly sp eaking, materialist. One 
should add that Ernst Mach also combined neutral monism 
with structuralism in physics.
7. Panprotopsychism
Feigl (1979, pp. 326, 335-6) also mentions the “panpsy-
chism” of American neorealists Charles A. Strong, Durant 
Drake and Roy Wood Sellars. This particular panpsychist 
tradition originated with the work of the English mathemati-
cian and philosopher William Clifford, who in 1878 defined 
a certain mind-stuff that would be present at the atomic level, 
and the composition of which would generate the conscious 
mind of humans: “(…) a moving molecule of inorganic mat-
ter does not possess mind or consciousness; but it possesses 
a small piece of mind-stuff ” (Clifford, 1878, p. 65). William 
James analyzed this view in his Principles of psychology (1890, 
chap. VI), rejecting it due to the difficulty of explaining how 
the myriad of mind-stuff grains would combine to generate a 
continuous phenomenal image (this “grain problem” or “com-
bination problem” was analyzed more recently by Lockwood, 
1993, and by Chalmers, 2013).
We highlight Drake’s view, which arrived at a clearly 
panqualityist position:
Your brain-processes are you, the conscious 
part of you. All the rest of the restless, mov-
ing world has its own inner nature; but it 
has no mechanism of introspection, or of 
speech. It cannot tell us, it does not know, 
what its own inner nature is. Because it has 
no mechanism of introspection, or of per-
ception, or memory, we cannot properly call 
these other bits of matter minds. But we can 
say that their inner nature is homogeneous 
with that of our brain-processes. Ordinary 
matter is the stuff out of which brains devel-
op; its inner nature we may call ‘mind-stuff’ 
(Drake, 1933, pp. 381-2).
Drake regrets having called his position “panpsychist” in 
his previous book, Mind and its place in nature:
The term ‘pan-psychism’ has proved mis-
leading. It suggests a denial of the exis-
tence of matter, and its replacement by a 
different sort of reality, an airy, insubstantial 
world. But the theory does not deny any of 
the teachings of physics, it merely rounds it 
out by telling us what matter is. It says that 
the world of matter-in-motion is the real 
world, but that physics has no means of dis-
covering its inner nature, and needs to be 
supplemented by an inference drawn from 
the special knowledge we have of our little 
corners of the world.
The term ‘pan-psychism’ also suggests that 
all the world is conscious. But, though, ac-
cording to this theory, the whole universe is 
of the same substance as our conscious life, 
it lacks – except where brains have devel-
oped – the peculiar organization of elements 
which make up a mind. The brain is not a 
special sort of stuff, it is a very special sort of 
mechanism. So the mind, which is the brain, 
considered in its inner nature, is not a differ-
ent sort of stuff from the rest of nature, but 
is a highly complex and delicately adjusted 
mechanism. It is a mechanism which carries 
on the processes of perception, memory, 
imagination, thought, and emotion. These 
Osvaldo Pessoa Jr. 
90Filosofi a Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 22(1):84-93, jan/apr 2021 
are all extremely complex processes; and 
where they are absent, we cannot properly 
speak of a ‘mind’ (Drake, 1933, p. 382).
In the previous section, we mentioned that qualitative 
physicalism can adopt the “panqualityist inference” and as-
sume that matter in general (outside the brain) also has qual-
ities. This inference, adopted by the Russellian-Schlickian 
monisms, leads to the notion that there is a “protopsychism” 
in nature, as expressed by Clifford and more clearly by Drake, 
resulting in the “panprotopsychist” view (term coined by 
Chalmers, 2013). These inscrutables would combine in a me-
chanically complicated way in the brain tissue to generate the 
qualitative complex that we experience.
8. Herbert Feigl and Stephen 
Pepper 
In a paper published in 1963, Feigl discussed a “famil-
iar objection” to the mind-body identity theory, which ad-
dresses a version of the “explanatory gap” (Levine, 1983), 
to be further examined in sections 9 and 10: “how could 
directly experienced qualities such as colors, sounds, smells, 
pains, emotions, or the like, be identical with neural process-
es whose properties are so fundamentally different?” (Feigl,
1963, p. 257). In presenting his view, Feigl appears to accept 
the three assumptions of qualitative physicalism (section 5), 
contrary to the materialists Place and Smart, who tend to re-
ject the thesis that qualia are real. Still, Feigl does not derive 
the colored-brain thesis, probably due to its counterintuitive 
charact er, so his view may be charact erized as a weak form of 
qualitative physicalism (and ours a strong form). 
But there is also another difference between our approach 
and that of Feigl, concerning the spatial localization of qualia. 
To begin with, Feigl explicitly adopts “structuralism in physics”, 
as we do, following Schlick and Russell. But he contends that 
the intuitive models we form of the brain, in a spatiotemporal 
background, cannot be considered real, but only heuristic and 
didact ic models: “The geometry employed in the description of 
physical space is a conceptual system which, though based upon 
the evidence of the sensory kind of spatiality, is itself not ade-
quately intuitable (visualizable, etc.)” (Feigl, 1963, p. 331). This 
is an anti-realistic stance on physics (in this case, classical phys-
ics). In contrast, the qualitative physicalism presented here takes 
a realist view of the picture of the physical world, at least within 
the limits of validity of classical physics.  Both versions of mate-
rialism take seriously the localization in physical space of mental 
properties, but such physical space is considered abstract by Feigl, 
and he attributes reality only to perceptual space: “Hence there 
is no conflict and no incompatibility in regard to the ‘location’ of, 
e.g., a directly experienced patch of color. It is where we ‘see’ it in 
phenomenal space. The systemically identical cerebral process is 
assigned a place in the abstract 3-dimensional manifold of physi-
cal space [...]” (Feigl, 1963, p. 259).
In the view maintained here, the patch of color is in a 
region of the real physical brain, and when we see the col-
or patch, we are observing directly this region of the optical 
sensorium (and only indirectly observing an avocado on the 
table). Thus, we add two theses to the previous list of section 
5: (4) Structuralism in physics. (5) Realism of the structur-
al (functional, mechanistic) description of physics. This last 
item defines our strong realist qualitative physicalism.
Stephen Pepper, a thinker close to Feigl, in his book Con-
cept and quality (1967), developed a “qualitative neural iden-
tity theory” (p. 76), stronger than Feigl’s in the sense of being 
panprotopsychist. In discussing the identity thesis, he starts 
from a version previously developed by Feigl (1958) but later 
abandoned, the “double language theory”. According to this 
view, there are two languages usually employed in psychology, 
the physical and the phenomenal, which can be translated into 
each other. Physical language can refer to various scales, such 
as the macroscopic or “molar” scale, which describes overt 
behaviors, or the microscopic scale, which describes cells, or 
even the nanoscopic one, which refers to molecular processes. 
The phenomenal language does not seem to encompass such 
a wide range of scales. An example of translation between 
the two languages  is as follows (adapted from Pepper, 1967, 
pp. 76-77): a subjective visual flash (phenomenal language) 
can also be described as the reflection of light into the retina, 
followed by a winking reflex (physical language). Such a “lin-
guistic version” of the identity thesis (i.e., the double language 
theory) thus assumes that the two utterances have the same 
referent, but one does not ask what this referent is (Pepper,
1967, p. 84). Feigl ended up abandoning this version because 
the referents of the utterances were not the same after all. 
The direct referent of the phenomenal language would be 
“raw feels” or qualia. And how about the physical language? 
In the new Feiglian version we saw above, it refers to “de-
scriptive symbols” (not, as a realist might expect, to physical 
reality). Pepper inherits this version of the identity thesis 
that combines realism of qualia with structuralism in phys-
ics interpreted antirealistically. However, unlike Feigl, as we 
have already mentioned (section 6), he adopts the “panpro-
topsychist inference” and considers that there are qualities 
outside the mind (panqualityism).
Pepper gave an example involving neurosurgeon Wilder 
Penfield, who directly stimulated with a pair of electrodes a 
certain region of a patient’s cortex, at a certain point, and the 
patient reported a “sensation in face”. If Penfield were to give 
a detailed account of the neural processes involved (some-
thing we do not yet have the ability to do fully), “what is the 
event pointed at by all the indirect evidence?” Pepper’s answer 
is that it would be the “qualitative experience of the patient” 
(1967, p. 85).
Pepper transforms the mind-body problem into the 
quality-concept (or quality-structure) problem, “a problem 
of qualitative actuality and various symbolic descriptions of 
it” (1967, p. 92). But he concludes with the more realist view 
that the qualitative process is located in the brain:
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Just how do physical terms make contact 
with an actual qualitative process? The iden-
tity theory brings this question to focus. Tak-
ing expert physiological and observational 
results seriously, it shows just where actual 
quality and physical concept meet. They 
meet in what is physiologically indicated as 
areas of man’s brain, or, perhaps more nar-
rowly, of his cerebral cortex (Pepper, 1967, 
p. 93).
9. A model for strong 
qualitative physicalism
Qualitative physicalism claims that a quale q is identical 
to a physico-chemical quality q, still unrecognized by science. 
The problem now is how to “explain” such a quality in the 
physical world.  The explanatory gap or hard problem of con-
sciousness now migrates from the mental/physical interface 
to the domain of physics and chemistry. The path to be ex-
plored rejects functionalism of qualia, or the claim that the 
causal structure of a system (describable in linguistic-math-
ematical terms) is sufficient for est ablishing its qualitative 
properties, and adds the element of “materiality”. 
In Pessoa (2015, p. 210) we called “Σω” (“sigma omega”) 
the sp ecific part of the brain (included in the sensorium) di-
rectly associated with the experience of a quale such as green-
ness, (Σω)
greenness
, a part that could be spatially localized in a 
restricted way (localizationism), or could be distributed in 
more extended regions (holism). The term Σ refers to the or-
ganization or structure of the system, i.e., the network of caus-
al relations (plus other relations) that is described in a mech-
anicist approach, which in the case of mental phenomena 
includes neuronal spikes and the sp ecific network of feedback 
loops that underlie the self. The term ω refers to the material-
ity of the system, i.e., the physico-chemical constitution of the 
brain tissue.3 This is a modified form of hylemorphism, as it 
concatenates matter and form (organization). For the strong 
qualitative physicalism proposed here, (i) a quale of greenness 
is identical to a physico-chemical quality, and (ii) such phys-
ico-chemical quality of greeness arises (emerges) from a sp e-
cific material organization (Σω)
greenness
.
It is plausible to assume that only a change in the orga-
nization of the system (change in the frequency with which 
electrochemical spikes affect the cells in the sensorium), main-
taining its materiality ω (that is, keeping the molecules of the 
cell and its surroundings constant), can change the subjective 
quality associated with the cells (in a localizationist model).4
But the dynamic structure Σ, which includes any relation that 
can be measured and reproduced in another system, has com-
ponents that do not contribute directly to the generation of a 
quale. That is, there is a spatiotemporal domain in which the 
structure is essential for the constitution of a quale, which can 
be denoted by Σe, but there are measurable relations (Σn) in 
other spatiotemporal domains that are not directly involved 
in the generation of the quale, but are part of what constitutes 
the mental phenomena. These could include structures that 
participate in the self, besides causal structures of support for 
the working of the local cognitive system.
The question of “why” a quale q arises from process 
(Σω)q is an expression of the hard problem of consciousness, 
or the explanatory gap mentioned in section 8. In the future, 
“bridge laws” will stipulate which q is instantiated when brain 
matter is organized in a certain way (Σω)q. At least part of 
these bridge laws will have to be est ablished as new scientific 
principles, and not as an “explanation” in the usual sense of the 
term. An explanation in the usual sense starts from a linguis-
tic-mathematical structural description Σ (for example, the 
description of the sun’s composition and the laws of nuclear 
physics), from which another linguistic-mathematical state-
ment Σ’ is derived (for example, intensity of solar radiation 
reaching the Earth), which can be verified by observing the 
interact ion of scientific instruments with this radiation. But 
(contrary to what some supporters of mechanicism and func-
tionalism seem to claim), one cannot start from a linguis-
tic-mathematical description and “derive” a quality (in the 
same sense as previously exemplified). In the future, we will 
be able to say: “subjective greenness arises from (Σω)
greenness
”, 
but this phrase by itself does not capture what it is like to ex-
perience greenness.
The introduction of non-explanatory postulates is com-
mon in science: for example, instead of asking why light has 
the same sp eed in all reference frames, Einstein in 1905 in-
troduced this hypothesis as a postulated principle within his 
theory of sp ecial relativity, and not as an explanation. Anal-
ogously, we suggest that for a basic set of qualities, the thesis 
that a process (Σω)q gives rise to a quality q should be taken as 
a postulated principle.
What would be the nature of this real physical material-
ity, which, along with its dynamical organization, give rise to 
physico-chemical qualities which are identical to subjective 
qualities? Considering the four fundamental physical interac-
tions, it seems reasonable that it is part of the electromagnetic 
interact ions, since it does not seem to involve gravitational 
and nuclear forces. There are several types of electrochemical 
interact ions recognized at the molecular level: in addition to 
the stronger covalent bond, there are various types of non-co-
valent interact ions. Another important question is the scale 
at which these subjective qualities emerge; a localizationist 
guess would be in the order of the size of a cell (∼ 5 microm-
eters). As for the localization of the sensorium, a reasonable 
3 The question of whether the materiality of a cell can be reduced to lower level structures is open to investigation. The scale that seems 
crucial here is the quantum level, which governs chemical reactions. 
4 In Pessoa (2019a), this model is used to explore two different situations involving qualia inversion.
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guess for visual qualia would be in subcortical regions such as 
the pulvinar, in the thalamus. Given this material substrate 
ω in the sensorium, the hypothesis is that incoming electro-
chemical spike trains Σ from the neocortex generate different 
physico-chemical qualities. 
10. The explanatory gap
While commenting on Price’s analysis, we already men-
tioned that Charlie Dunbar Broad articulated an emergentist 
materialist view for the mind-body problem, in his book Mind 
and its place in nature (1925), the same title as Drake’s book of 
the same year. He criticized the attempt to reduce a mentalist 
statement, such as “I am aware of a red patch”, to a behavioral 
statement, such as “a part of this body is behaving in such and 
such a way” (Broad, 1925, p. 622). Taking further this criti-
cism to reductionism, he extended the definition of behav-
iorism to include statements that describe the “behaviors” of 
microscopic parts of the body, as in “a molecular movement is 
going on in a certain part of my brain” (Broad, 1925, p. 622). 
Such a description is what I have called a “mechanicist” de-
scriptio n. For Broad (1925), there is something which has the 
“charact eristic” of being redness (in his words, of being “my 
awareness of a red patch”), and there is something which has 
the charact eristic of being a molecular motion. These two 
“somethings” could even be identical, ponders Broad, but the 
two charact eristics or properties are clearly different. He re-
jects the possibility that they be two identical charact eristics, 
such as “rich” and “wealthy”; because for the qualitative aware-
ness one can ask whether it is clear or confused, and for the 
molecular movement whether it is swift or circular, but not 
the other way around. He therefore concludes that qualitative 
awareness cannot be reduced to molecular movement (Broad, 
1925, p. 623).
The qualitative physicalism presented here introduces 
the idea that the organized material states Σω of the brain 
may give rise to physico-chemical qualities q, which are iden-
tical to subjective qualities q. However, the difference between 
the charact eristics (properties) pointed out by Broad remains, 
although shifted to the physical world. The brain system has 
a microscopic dynamic organization Σ that may be described 
by the relational scientific language, and in addition has a sp e-
cific materiality ω, which combined give rise to qualities q. In 
the present approach, the mind-body problem, as posed by 
Broad, becomes an ontological issue regarding matter. 
As a conclusion, consider the following comment by 
James Cornman (1962), which takes up Broad’s argument 
(see Moravia, 1995, p. 115):
We can talk about intense, unbearable, 
nagging, or throbbing pains. And yellow, 
dim, fading, or circular after-images. And 
dogmatic, false, profound, or unconscious 
beliefs. On the other hand we can also dis-
cuss publicly observable, spatially located, 
swift, irreversible physical processes. Thus if 
the Identity Theory is correct, it seems that 
we should sometimes be able to say truth-
fully that physical processes such as brain 
processes are dim or fading or nagging or 
false [or yellow], and that mental phenome-
na such as after-images are publicly observ-
able or physical or spatially located or swift 
(Cornman, 1962, p. 490).
There are three cases to be considered here:
(i) Concerning qualia, such as yellowness, the col-
ored-brain thesis argues that they are real physical properties 
localized in the properly organized brain matter.
(ii) Other attributes of mental objects, such as nag-
ging (in the sense of persistent) or dimness, are mechanical 
properties (Σn, see section 9) identifiable both subjectively in 
(ΣeΣnω) and by neuroscientific measurement.
(iii) The truth value of an idea is a relational property 
between a mental state and a situation in the outside world. 
Thus, for the internalism of qualitative physicalism, being 
true or false is not an attribute of a mental state (contrary to 
what an externalist would say, like Kim, 1982, p. 57).
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